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This paper develops empirical methods of assessing the sustainability and feasibility of
public debt using the No Ponzi Game criterion, using the Philippines as the testing case.
Both historical data and forecasts generated by a quarterly macro-econometric model are
used in the assessment. Stochastic simulations are carried out to mimic future
uncertainty. The test results show that, up to the end of the present administration in
2010, the Philippine government debt is not sustainable but weakly feasible, that the
feasibility is vulnerable to major adverse shocks, and that simple budgetary deficit
control policy is inadequate for achieving debt sustainability or strengthening feasibility.
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I. Introduction
Empirical tests of government debt sustainability are mostly carried out on checking
the No Ponzi Game (NPG) condition using historical time-series data. Theoretically, the
NPG condition is derived within the framework of an infinite-horizon representative
agent model. However, public Ponzi games are shown to be feasible, within the
framework of a stochastic overlapping generations model, in a situation where the
government manages its bond portfolio to a lower debt rate than the dominant market
rate. This paper develops the method of empirical tests on both the sustainability and
feasibility conditions in accordance with these theoretical postulates. Three aspects of
improvement are proposed to make the tests more relevant to theoretical as well as policy
concerns. The first is to extend the historical time-series data by utilizing forecasted
series from macro-econometric model to make the test results directly forward-looking;
the second is to allow for the possibility of having the government bond rate staying
below the dominant market lending rate; the third is to take into consideration forecast
uncertainty and possible adverse shocks by making use of stochastic simulations as well
as policy simulations. The proposed new methods are applied to the Philippine case.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the fiscal
and public debt situation in recent years. Section 3 outlines the testable theories of public
debt sustainability and feasibility. Section 4 reports the empirical test results. The last
section concludes.
II. The fiscal and government debt situation in the Philippines
The huge public debt in the Philippines has raised serious and growing concerns
about the ability of the Philippine government to manage its debt obligations and the2
long-run sustainability of government fiscal policy. Several studies done on the
Philippines have shown, by detailed analyses of the fiscal position over recent years, how
the country’s public debt has been fluctuating from sustainable to unsustainable levels,
see e.g. Paderanga (1995; 2001) and Manasan (1997; 2004).
Chronic deficits have marked the Philippine government’s fiscal position since the
early years of the country’s development.
1 There was brief respite in the mid-1990s when
the government’s fiscal position improved enough to register a surplus of less than 1%
for the period 1994-1997. The occurrence of the Asian financial crisis, however, pushed
the fiscal balance back to the negative plane when it fell to –1.9% of GDP in 1998, and
then plummeted to –5.2% in 2002. In 2003, the deficit stood at 4.6% of GDP (see Figure
2.1).
The deterioration of the fiscal balance is mostly due to shortfalls in government
revenues, especially tax revenues (which accounts for more than 85% of the total). The
national government’s revenue efforts have declined from a peak of 19.9% of GDP in
1994 to 14.6% of GDP in 2003 (see Figure 2.2). From its peak of about 17% in 1997, the
tax effort has slid to 12.5% in 2003. Government expenditures, on the other hand, have
been fairly stable, averaging about 18% of GDP for the period 1980-2003. Its growth has
been kept to a minimum and has been on a downward trend since 2000. In particular,
primary spending (i.e., national government spending net of interest payments) has been
reined in, with its share to GDP falling from 16.3% in 1999 to 14.0% in 2003. Capital
expenditures have been reduced – after reaching its peak of more than a quarter of total
                                                
1 In the 1960s, government was in deficit 8 out of the 10 years and fiscal deficit averaged about 1% of GDP
for the decade. In the 1970s it was in deficit 7 out of the 10 years and the fiscal deficit averaged about one-
half of 1% of GDP. In the 1980s the government was in deficit all 10 years and fiscal deficit averaged
about 2.5% of GDP.3
expenditures in the early 1980s, it is down to 13.5% in 2003.
2 In contrast, the amount
spent for servicing of debt escalated. From an average of 4.6% in 1975-79, it went up to
about 7% in 1980-83, ballooned to almost 25% in 1984-89 and has averaged more than
24% in 2000-03 (Figure 2.3).
A major threat to the national government’s fiscal position is the large stock of
national government debt and the associated costs of servicing that debt. In the 1970s and
80s, large debt inflows were used to stimulate the economy and to provide a cushion
against external shocks that had often plagued the economy in the early years of its
development. Then in the 1990s it also became a means to service the liabilities of ailing
government agencies. By this time, domestic resources have become a significant part of
Philippine public debt reflecting the government’s struggle to service its foreign debt
while incurring fiscal deficits (Figure 2.4). From a peak of P95.4 billion in 1994, primary
balance (i.e., total revenues less non-debt expenditures) went into deficit in 2002 (P24.9
billion) before registering a surplus of P26.5 billion in 2003.
The national government’s total outstanding debt stood at P3.36 trillion (which is 78
percent of GDP) at the end of 2003. Including contingent liabilities, this would amount to
about P4.1 trillion (or 94.5 percent of GDP). The consolidated public sector debt is much
higher at P5.9 trillion – a whooping 137 percent of GDP. All three are on an upward
trend (Figure 2.5).
The growth of public debt has been very high, averaging above 15 percent between
1999 – 2004. NG debt has been growing at a higher rate for the same period, with the
increase largely attributed to the continuing national government deficits. However, an
                                                
2 Of note is the fact that infrastructure spending of the national government has remained repressed and has
not exceeded 2% of GDP. Indeed, the brunt of fiscal adjustment has primarily been absorbed by4
equally sizeable amount (about 37 percent) of the increase in debt is due to non-
budgetary items and assumed liabilities of government corporations, see Figure 2.5,
underscoring the continuous practice of condoning inefficiency and irresponsibility of
government-owned and controlled corporations.
Warnings of the public debt problem have recently been voiced at an increasing
volume by economists, institutional investors in the Philippines as well as internationally,
e.g. see De Dios et al (2004). However, most of these are based on case analyses rather
than rigorous empirical tests. This paper attempts to fill in this gap.
III.Theories of Government Debt Sustainability and Feasibility
The key consideration for any government to resort to debt is the availability and
feasibility of debt financing. This consideration underlies the theoretical approach to
determine the debt sustainability on the lenders’ constraint, which is commonly
expressed by the present value constraint (PVC).
Under the highly idealistic assumptions of an economy with one sector, in steady
state and on a dynamically efficient growth path, the PVC-based theory of government
debt results in the long-run condition of No Ponzi Games (NPG), e.g. see Chalk and
Hemming (2000) and Bergman (2001). The theory starts from the government debt
accounting identity. With respect to the Philippine case, this identity results in:
(1) 1 1 1 1         t t t t t L D B q B
where Bt denotes the government debt at time t, qt the one-period interest rate factor, e.g.
t t r q   1 , with rt being the equilibrium interest rate with respect to the marginal rate of
                                                                                                                               
infrastructure and other development spending – expenditures developing countries like the Philippines
badly need.5
substitution derived from the optimization of consumers’ preference function, Dt is the
primary fiscal deficit, i.e. budget deficit excluding interest payment, and Lt denotes the
off-budget account deficit, due mainly to the  contingent liabilities of government-owned
and controlled corporations.




































Since the first term on the right-hand side of (2) is expected to balance out in general, the
















The limit in (3) defines the necessary condition for the long-run debt sustainability. It
implies that government debt cannot grow faster than the average interest rate in the long
run.
A popular alternative is to examine the sustainability condition in terms of the debt-
to-income ratio, instead of debt alone, based on the argument that all the budget variables
are highly dependent on the macroeconomic situation, see for example Cuddington
(1996). Let us define the debt ratio by  t t t Y B b /   , the primary deficit ratio by  t t t Y D d /  
and the off budget account deficit ratio by  t t t Y L l /   , where Yt is the aggregate income
and often represented by GDP or GNP. Equation (2) can be rewritten as:

































where gt is the growth factor:  t t t Y g Y 1 1     . The NPG condition corresponding to (3)
becomes:
                                                













Equation (5) highlights the importance of the dynamic efficiency assumption, since it is
necessary to have the interest rates larger than the economic growth rates for the
nontrivial case of  0 z W t b  in (5).
4
Empirical tests of the debt sustainability conditions (3) or (5) entail knowledge of the
time-series properties of the variables in these equations, since these conditions require us
to infer the asymptotic properties of the limit functions from finite data samples. In
particular, it is crucial to know the time-series properties of the debt or debt ratio series,
as the interest rate and the economic growth rate are normally expected to be either
stationary or non-trended random walk.
5 Following Bergman (2001), we assume that the
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where Ht is a zero-mean stationary process. When  1 1  D , the NPG condition (3) is
satisfied. When the debt series is nonstationary, i.e.  1 1 t D , the NPG condition (3) can be

































































                                                                                                                               
considered, e.g. see Lebow (2004).
4 The assumption is embodied in the infinite-horizon representative consumer model, e.g. see Bohn (1995).
5 A number of empirical tests are built on the time-series relationship between the fiscal deficit and the debt
series, see e.g. (Quinto 1995), (Bohn 1998). However, this approach is not applicable here since there is an
off-budget deficit component in the Philippine government debt.
6 This is a testable assumption. The results below can be extended to an AR(n) process when n>1.7
The NPG condition now becomes:





























Condition (8) requires that the degree of explosiveness in the roots of the debt series be
no larger than what the compounding interest rates could dampen out in the long run.
The same approach applies if empirical tests are based on the debt ratio. Starting from
an AR(1) process:
(9) t t t b b Q E E     1 1 0




























































we obtain the following convergence conditions:


























It is a widely known fact that government bonds normally enjoy significantly lower
interest rates than the market equilibrium rates. Moreover, many governments utilize the
bond market to reduce their debt interest payments by issuing bonds of different
maturities to roll over government debt, e.g. see (Bohn 1995; 1998). As a result, the
aggregate interest rate of the government bond portfolio is normally lower than the
growth rate of the economy, making the simple NPG scheme (5) implausible, see e.g.
(Blanchard and Weil 2001). Under this situation, the issue then becomes to what extent
the government can violate the present value budget constraint and make it feasible to
play debt Ponzi games.8
In a recent paper, Barbie et al (2004) investigate this issue by means of the stochastic
overlapping generations model. They establish the necessary and sufficient conditions of
the feasibility of government debt Ponzi games under a scenario where the government
utilizes rollover bond issuance strategies.
7 Their conditions essentially boil down to the
non-divergence of the ratio of the aggregate interest rate of the public bond portfolio to
the economic growth rate under all kinds of stochastic shocks:
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  (necessary and sufficient condition)
where
b q  denotes aggregate interest rate factor of the government bond portfolio, z
denotes the state of random shocks and I a finite positive bound representing the credit
constraint faced by the government. Conditions (12) and (13) show that government
Ponzi games would not be possible unless the government could obtain debt finance at a
lower interest rate than the average economic growth rate in the long run. Barbie et al
(2004) refer to the ratio,  g q
b / , as the real interest rate of debt payment, and to I as
setting a fixed upper bound for the debt ratio. The latter is not difficult to see if we
assume (5) converges to a positive number instead of zero when the interest rate is the
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7 Notice that the condition for feasibility is weaker than that for sustainability, see Barbie et al (2001).9
IV.Empirical Tests of Government Debt Sustainability and Feasibility
In this section, empirical tests are conducted on the Philippine national government
(NG) debt. Ideally, the tests should be conducted on the consolidated public debt. But this
series is available only at annual frequency. As the consolidated public debt is roughly
1.7 times the NG debt (see the footnote in Figure 2.5), the conclusions that we draw from
the empirical tests on the NG debt should be also applicable to the consolidated public
debt.
Almost all the empirical tests of government debt sustainability in the literature have
been carried out using historical time-series data, e.g. see (Bohn 1998), (Chalk and
Hemming 2000). However, a major weakness of these tests is that the past results may
not be directly projected into the future, where all the PVC theories are really focused on.
This can be especially worrisome considering that the dynamics of the government debt
tends to be highly susceptible to the macroeconomic environment in a small and open
economy like the Philippines.
Here, we conduct the tests using a quarterly time-series sample combining historical
data with future data forecasted by a quarterly macro-econometric model of the
Philippines built by the Asian Development Bank (we refer to this model as the ADB
Philippine model thereafter). The model contains over 80 variables and is estimated using
the data sample from 1990Q1 to 2004Q2, although some data series are shorter, e.g. the
government fiscal account series, including the debt series to be used in our tests, start
from 1993Q1, see Ducanes et al (2005) for more detailed description of the model. The
forecast period is 2004Q3 – 2014Q4. Forecast values of some exogenous variables are
partly based on forecasts from the OECD Economic Outlook and Oxford Economic
Forecasting World Model; otherwise, the forecasts of an exogenous variable are10
extrapolated from its present time path. During the forecast period, a large number of
stochastic simulations are computed using the bootstrap method for shock generation.
8
This method enables us to empirically mimic the z component of equations (12) and (13)
in accordance with the random patterns of the ADB Philippine model residuals. Quantiles
are calculated from the large set (400 in our experiments) of the simulation results to
illustrate the distribution of the stochastic forecasts. In particular, values at 2% and 97%
quantiles are used as the approximate 95% confidence band of the simulation mean
values. Below, we refer to the data series of the simulation mean values as the ‘mean’
data series and the other two as the ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ data series respectively. Figure
4.1 shows the debt and debt ratio series with these forecasting bands.
Let us first examine the simple time-series properties of the government debt and
debt/GDP ratio series respectively. As shown from the unit-root test results in Table 4.1,
both series exhibit strong non-stationary properties, with the debt series showing certain
explosive tendency. The test results are also reflected in the ensuing regression analysis.
We start by running an AR(4) model for the debt and debt ratio series respectively in
order to test the assumption of AR(1) in equations (6) and (9). As visible from Table 4.2,
the assumed AR(1) process is accepted for the debt ratio series in both the full-sample
and sub-sample estimations whereas the debt process is captured by an AR(3) in the full-
sample estimation and by an AR(1) only in the sub-sample estimations. Moreover, the
one-lag coefficient estimates for the debt ratio exhibit stronger time invariance than those
for the debt series, conforming to what was expected in the previous section.
In view of the regression results, we have conducted the sustainability tests on the
debt ratio only. It is discernible from the recursive  1 ˆ E  of (9) in Figure 4.2 that this
                                                
8 The method randomly draws shocks from single equation residuals over a specified historical sample11
coefficient drifts below unity in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and converges
to unity during the forecasting period of the sample, even though the unit value is within
the 95% band for the entire sample. Considering the finite-sample uncertainty in  1 ˆ E , two
versions of condition (11) are tested, one using the full sample estimate  1 ˆ E  and the other













































The condition relating to the intercept term is disregarded here because its estimates are
insignificant, as shown in Table 4.2.
In the NPG theories, government bonds are assumed to bear the same rate as the
equilibrium interest rate. However, this assumption seldom holds in reality. Thus, in
order to examine the different effects of interest rates, we consider three rates: market
lending rate, 91-day Treasury bill (TB) rate, and government debt portfolio rate derived
from the government debt interest payment and the debt series. As seen from Figure 4.3,
the government rates are remarkably lower than the market rate. More interestingly, the
derived portfolio rate is far smoother than the TB rate, possibly reflecting government
efforts in debt portfolio management to minimize and stabilize the debt cost payment. To
check whether the chosen rates represent adequately the market rates for the government
bonds, Figure 4.4 plots these rates together with the JP Morgan bond yield of the
weighted Philippine sovereign bonds for the period of 2000Q1 – 2004Q2. Discernibly,
the 91 TB rate and the portfolio rate are a bit lower than the JP Morgan bond yield while
the lending rate is higher. This suggests that the test results from the three rates should
provide us with a fairly good confidence region.
                                                                                                                               
period and adds them to each forecast period. For more details, see (Pierse 2001).12
Three pairs of the series in (11’) are calculated, each using one of the three interest
rates. The results are plotted in Figure 4.5. Noticeably, the results using the full-sample
coefficient estimate show significantly higher values than those using the recursive
results. This is due to the fact that  1 ˆ E  exceeds its sub-sample estimates for over one third
of the sample period, as shown in Figure 4.2. However, the full-sample  1 ˆ E  should be
relatively reliable for out-of-sample inference based on the recursive results as it
converges to a highly constant value with the sample size. Notice that the lending rate
appears to provide the only case where the NPG condition is likely to be satisfied in the
infinite future, as it gradually decreases with time. The series based on the portfolio rate
also appears to be converging very slowly and is estimated to be approximately zero
around 2020, indicating that government Ponzi game is present during the current
regime.
9
To directly assess the feasibility of the Ponzi game, we calculate the test series of (12)
and (13) using the portfolio rate and the TB rate respectively, and plot them in Figure 4.5.
The results show that only the necessary condition is satisfied up to 2010, not the
sufficient condition. This indicates the feasibility of the debt Ponzi game played by the
government to be near the borderline of becoming infeasible for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, the sufficient condition (13) is likely to hold for the infinite future as both
test series under (12) show a downward trend towards zero. Noticeably, the series for the
necessary condition using the portfolio rate shows a visibly slower converging speed than
that using the TB rate, suggesting that the government bond portfolio faces a tighter
credit constraint than short-term bills. This suggests the increasing risk that investors
attach to the government bonds of longer terms.
                                                
9 The next election year is 2010.13
Indeed, practical concerns over the future uncertainty of the debt situation is
asymmetric, i.e., investors are far more watchful of those uncertain situations when the
sustainability or feasibility of government debt is at risk of being violated than vice versa.
The worry is warranted by a number of government debt default crises triggered by
adverse shocks in small and open economies with weak governments, such as Argentina
and Brazil.
10 Since the feasibility test results in Figure 4.5 indicate that the present debt
situation in the Philippines is about marginally feasible, we run a model simulation to
examine how much an adverse shock would worsen the government debt situation. The
simulation assumes the adverse shock to be a currency crisis occurring in 2005Q4 –
2006Q4, with the peso-dollar exchange rate devaluing 40% in total (see Figure 4.6).
11
Both the sustainability test (11’) and the feasibility tests (12) and (13) are re-
calculated using the simulation results for the forecasting sub-sample, see Figure 4.7. In
comparison with Figure 4.5, the sustainability results (11’) are now in a visibly worse
state, especially with the disappearance of the downward trend in the series based on the
portfolio rate and the lending rate; the test results using the portfolio rate no longer hold
for either (11’) or (12), illustrating that the currently feasible state of the government debt
is indeed fragile and highly susceptible to adverse external shocks.
Given the severity of the government debt situation, we run another simulation to
examine whether fiscal policy adjustments would help improve the situation. We set the
simulation as achieving zero deficit by 2010, in accordance with the pledge by the current
government. Experimenting with various schemes of curbing fiscal expenditure and
                                                
10 Calvo et al (2003) demonstrate how a mismatch in the public debt composition led to a crisis in
Argentina triggered by its currency devaluation shock; Razin and Sadka (2002) show how a forthcoming
election in Brazil, which indicates expected regime change, could trigger a debt crisis even though the debt
ratio is relatively low and the fundamentals are sound.14
raising tax revenue, we find that this target is achievable by having the tax revenue
increase by 11% per annum
12 together with a capped annual growth at 5% of the
government expenditure net of interest payment for six years, i.e. 2004Q4 — 2010Q3.
Figure 4.8 shows the dynamic path of the budget deficit under this simulation as
compared with that of the default simulation (the left panel), and the impact of this
simulation on GDP growth as well as interest rate (the right panel). Noticeably, the fiscal
target leads to prompt deficit deterioration post the target period and a persistent
slowdown of the economy during the target period, suggesting that such a severe target is
highly likely to incur grave fiscal burden for the next regime while depressing the overall
economy during the present regime. This kind of policy consequence is hardly surprising
in view of the already undersized public sector in the Philippines, as described in Section
II. What is surprising are the simulation test results, which show no chance of achieving
the sustainability condition or the feasibility condition within the present regime (see
Figure 4.9), in spite of the heavy policy cost. Our finding reveals the inadequacy of
designing fiscal policy around controlling budget deficit alone in order to achieve debt
sustainability. Much more comprehensive policies are required.
V. Conclusions
This paper develops empirical methods of assessing the sustainability and feasibility
of the government debt situation, using the Philippines as the testing case. The
assessment is based on the NPG criterion and mainly carried out on the debt-to-GDP
                                                                                                                               
11 The exchange rate is exogenous in the Philippine model. Since the model also assumes the world trade
demand as exogenous, the simulation does not reflect the possible reactions of this variable to the
devaluation shocks.
12 Notice that increase in tax revenue does not necessarily depend on raising tax rates. In the Philippine
case, improvement in taxation efficiency and promotion of faster economic growth are the paramount
factors.15
ratio using both its historical data and forecasts generated by a macro-econometric model
of the Philippine economy.
Our assessment shows that the government debt situation is not sustainable as far as
the present regime is concerned. One key reason for the existing high government debt is
the fact that the government still enjoys lower bond rates than the market lending rates. In
other words, the Philippine government bonds are still perceived as having relatively low
default risk. Our assessment also shows that the Philippine government is playing a
weakly feasible debt Ponzi game. The debt strategy satisfies the necessary condition but
fails the sufficiency condition for feasibility up to 2014, although it might satisfy both
conditions for the infinitely remote future. These results indicate the vulnerability of the
debt situation.
The vulnerability is further confirmed by our experiment of a shock simulation using
the Philippine model. We find that the government debt no longer satisfies the debt
feasibility condition under a hypothetical exchange rate crisis. This result shows that the
government is facing a high risk of running into a debt crisis in the event of a major
adverse shock to the economy.
Our findings provide strong support to the warnings about the critical government
debt situation and highlight the difficulty and the urgency of improving the government’s
fiscal position in the present Philippine economy. Indeed, our model simulation shows
that the simple fiscal policy of medium-term budget deficit control alone is inadequate
for reversing the unsustainable debt situation. This underscores the importance of
studying the dynamic interaction between proposed corrective policies to control public
debt and the underlying macroeconomic variables. Any policy aimed at addressing the
debt sustainability problem must take into account not just its effect on debt but also its16
effect on other economic variables, such as interest rates and the overall economic
growth, which are themselves factors that determine debt sustainability. What is highly
needed are more comprehensive and well-coordinated policies aimed at promoting
sustained economic growth, increasing resilience to exogenous shocks as well as
improving debt management.
The results further point at the non-evadable responsibility that public debt creditors
and donors should take in helping the heavily debt-burdened country to avoid a debt
crisis. In particular, large institutional creditors must review lending policies to ensure
that their loans and accompanying provisions are carefully based on the debt
sustainability of the country concerned as derived from its macroeconomic framework. If
loan provisions are not based on market perceived risk or if debt service can largely be
covered by grants, aid, or debt relief, then the government will have little incentive to
pursue sound macroeconomic policies and increase its capacity to pay (see IMF and IDA,
2004).
What would therefore be the optimal policy strategy to attain debt and fiscal
sustainability for the current regime? The solution is beyond the scope of the present
study, but the results, hopefully, would help policy making towards the right direction.17
Appendix: Data Description and Sources
Data series Description Source
1
91-day Treasury Bill Rate
(%)
Weighted averages per annum CEIC Data Company Ltd., BSP, ADB
Philippine Model
Bond Yield JP Morgan Asia Bond Weighted Yield of
Philippine Sovereign Bonds
Datastream
Capital Outlays In billion pesos DBM
Consolidated Public
Sector Debt
In million pesos CEIC Data Company Ltd., Btr
Expenditure In million pesos CEIC Data Company Ltd., Btr
Fiscal Deficit Revenue less expenditure BTr
Gross Domestic Product Current price (in million pesos) CEIC Data Company Ltd., ADB
Philippine Model
Interest Payments Current price (in million pesos) CEIC Data Company Ltd., BTr, ADB
Philippine Model
Lending Rate (%) Weighted averages per annum. Annual
rates are averages of monthly rates.
Monthly rates are annual percentage
equivalent of all commercial banks' actual
monthly interest income on their peso-
denominated loans to the total outstanding
levels of their peso-denominated loans,
bills discounted, mortgage contract
receivables and restructured loans.
CEIC Data Company Ltd., BSP, ADB
Philippine Model
MOOE In billion pesos DBM
National Government
Debt
In million pesos CEIC Data Company Ltd., Btr
National Government
Outstanding Debt
Outstanding Domestic Debt + Outstanding
Foreign Debt, Current price (in million
pesos)
CEIC Data Company Ltd., BTr, ADB
Philippine Model
Personal Services In billion pesos DBM
Portfolio rate (%) Interest payments/National government
outstanding debt
CEIC Data Company Ltd., Btr, ADB
Philippine Model
Primary Deficit Revenue less primary spending BTr
Primary Spending Expenditure less interest payments BTr
Revenue In million pesos CEIC Data Company Ltd., Btr
1Actual data are sourced from CEIC and/or official sources.  Forecast data are sourced from the ADB Philippine
Model. Bureau of Treasury is abbreviated as BTr. Department of Budget and Management is abbreviated as DBM.18
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Source: National Statistical Coordination Board; Bureau of Treasury.
Figure 2.2 Fiscal Aggregates













Primary SpendingFigure 2.3 National government  (NG) expenditures 2003
Source: Department of Budget and Management.
Figure 2.4 National government outstanding debt







































DomesticFigure 2.5 Consolidate public sector debt and NG debt
Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd., Bureau of Treasury. Simple regression of the
consolidated public debt on the NG outstanding debt using data from 1993 onwards
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Note: The solid lines are the mean data series; the dotted lines are the upper and the lower series forming
approximately 95% confidence interval.
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Note: the dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals.25
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Note: TB rate denotes 91-days treasury bill rate. The solid lines are the mean data series; the dotted lines are the
upper and the lower series forming approximately 95% confidence interval.











JP Morgan Asia Bond Weighted Yield of Philippine Sovereign Bonds
Note: JP Morgan Asia Bond Weighted Yield of Philippine Sovereign Bonds
comes from Datastream.26
Figure 4.5 Tests of (11’), (12) and (13)
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Note: It takes about 6 further years for the portfolio rate series in (11’) to converge to zero. The solid curves in
(12) and (13) are mean series and the dotted lines are the lower and upper series forming a 95%
confidence interval.  The portfolio series in (12) would take about 4 further years to converge to zero.27
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Solid line: default values; dotted line: assumed shock values28
Figure 4.7. Tests of (11’), (12) and (13) under exchange rate shock simulation
Sustainability condition (11’)
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Note: In this simulation, the exchange rate devalues by 11%, 14%, 10% and 5% for the consecutive four
quarters starting from 2005Q4, recovers by 5% in 2006Q4 and drops by 2% in 2007Q1, and stays
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Figure 4.8 Fiscal simulation impact: Budget deficit and GDP growth
Budget deficit:  Solid line: fiscal simulation; dotted line: default values.
Differences between fiscal simulation and default: Solid line: GDP growth rate;
dotted line lending rate.30
Figure 4.9 Tests of (11’), (12) and (13) under fiscal simulation
Sustainability condition (11’)
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Note: In the model simulation, tax revenue is assumed to increase by 11% annually and government non-
interest expenditure growth is controlled to not exceed 5% annually during 2005-2010. It takes about 2
further years for the portfolio rate series to converge to zero in (11’). It takes over 5 further years for it
to converge to zero in (12).31
Table 4.1 Unit root tests by augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test
Debt series





3 2.03 1.01 -0.52 0.60
2 2.00 1.01 4.49 0.00
1 4.78 1.02 -1.55 0.12
0 4.52 1.01   
Debt ratio series
3 -0.74 0.98 0.91 0.37
2 -0.66 0.99 -1.83 0.07
1 -0.86 0.98 -0.06 0.95
0 -0.88 0.98   
Note: The null hypothesis is E = 0. The critical values of ADF tests are: -2.90 at 5% and -3.51
at 1%. The sample covers 1994Q1 – 2014Q4. Seasonal dummies are added in the debt ratio
test, as the series exhibits significant seasonal feature inherent from GDP.
Table 4.2.  AR(4) Estimations for the median series of debt and debt ratio
Coefficient Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Intercept
Full Sample: 1994Q1 to 2014Q4
Debt 0.9410 0.5521 -0.5482 0.0630 26180
(0.1087)* (0.1485)* (0.1516)* 0.1209 13810
Debt Ratio 0.9950 -0.2063 0.2951 -0.1004 0.0474
(0.1102)* 0.1511 0.1514 0.1102 0.0632
Sub-sample: 1994Q1 to 2009Q4
Debt 1.0037 0.2291 -0.1526 -0.0629 8866
(0.1243)* 0.1783 0.1807 0.1274 13270
Debt Ratio 0.9875 -0.0895 0.1760 -0.0874 0.0401
(0.1274)* 0.1745 0.1749 0.1271 0.0776
Historical data: 1994Q1 to 2004Q2
Debt 0.9432 0.0138 0.0968 0.0117 -47302
(0.1544)* 0.2053 0.2064 0.1624 25420
Debt Ratio 1.0462 -0.0173 0.1146 -0.1995 0.1385
(0.157)* 0.225 0.2272 0.1582 0.1339
Note: The statistics in brackets are standard errors. Those marked by * are significant at 5%.
Seasonal dummies are added in the AR(4) model for the debt ratio.This working paper has been produced by
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